EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES (Q5441933): Difference between revisions

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+Q4805737
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+Q3997197
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+The Bargaining Problem
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+Two-Person Cooperative Games
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+Two-person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms
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