Dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with alternating leaders (Q924604): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nonrwa.2006.11.019 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2050614322 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimality conditions for the bilevel programming problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4317892 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Stackelburg solution for two-person games with biased information patterns / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Foundations of bilevel programming / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimal dynamic law enforcement / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A DYNAMIC GAME OF OFFENDING AND LAW ENFORCEMENT / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Bilevel Model of Taxation and Its Application to Optimal Highway Pricing / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop complete information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Dynamic programming approach to discrete time dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with independent and dependent followers / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4332850 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Stackelberg solution for games with many players / rank
 
Normal rank

Revision as of 09:10, 28 June 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with alternating leaders
scientific article

    Statements

    Identifiers

    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references