The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship (Q943782): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 15:46, 28 June 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship |
scientific article |
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The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship (English)
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10 September 2008
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real options
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asymmetric information
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agency conflicts
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audit
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