Stock grants as a commitment device (Q959669): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2005.04.009 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W3022691158 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Stock options and managerial optimal contracts / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 22:42, 28 June 2024

scientific article
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Stock grants as a commitment device
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    Stock grants as a commitment device (English)
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    12 December 2008
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    moral hazard
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    optimal contracts
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    CEO compensation
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    stock grants
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