Private Capacities in Mechanism Design (Q3182917): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03816-7_11
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+W1500701067
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+Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
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+Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
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+Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
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+Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
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+Incentives in Teams
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+Algorithms – ESA 2005
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+Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
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+Q2934709
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+Optimal Auction Design
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+Algorithmic mechanism design
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+A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
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