Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule (Q1042133): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 06:46, 2 July 2024

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Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule
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    Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule (English)
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    7 December 2009
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    auctions/bidding
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    VCG rule
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    coalitions
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    revenues
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    payment rules
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