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Latest revision as of 13:02, 2 July 2024

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Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
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    Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play (English)
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    4 March 2010
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    repeated game
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    random matching
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    community enforcement
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    belief-free equilibrium
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    first-order information
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