Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function (Q969466): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 19:58, 2 July 2024

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Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function
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    Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function (English)
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    7 May 2010
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    first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions
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    bidding strategy
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    expected revenue
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    Cobb-Douglas utility function
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