Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule (Q974203): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.022 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2067536333 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Implementing a public project and distributing its cost / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Subgame Perfect Implementation / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 20:37, 2 July 2024

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Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule
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    Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule (English)
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    27 May 2010
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    public good
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    efficient mechanism
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    cost-sharing rule
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    symmetry
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