Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule (Q974203): Difference between revisions
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.022 / rank | |||
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2067536333 / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Implementing a public project and distributing its cost / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Subgame Perfect Implementation / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 20:37, 2 July 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule |
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Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule (English)
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27 May 2010
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public good
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efficient mechanism
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cost-sharing rule
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symmetry
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