Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities (Q2638313): Difference between revisions

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+MaRDI publication profile
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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.05.002
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+W2068262561
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2068262561 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
@@ Property / cites work: Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation / rank @@
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+Core in a simple coalition formation game
@@ Property / cites work: Core in a simple coalition formation game / rank @@
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+Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
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+A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stability of marriage with externalities
@@ Property / cites work: Stability of marriage with externalities / rank @@
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+Stable matchings and preferences of couples
@@ Property / cites work: Stable matchings and preferences of couples / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Two-sided matching problems with externalities
@@ Property / cites work: Two-sided matching problems with externalities / rank @@
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