Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities (Q2638313): Difference between revisions
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Property / cites work: Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Core in a simple coalition formation game / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Stability of marriage with externalities / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Stable matchings and preferences of couples / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Two-sided matching problems with externalities / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 05:47, 3 July 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities |
scientific article |
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Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities (English)
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15 September 2010
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one-to-one matching
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externalities
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stability
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core
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