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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0102-y / rank
 
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Revision as of 06:59, 3 July 2024

scientific article
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English
Circular domains
scientific article

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    Circular domains (English)
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    8 October 2010
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    circular domain
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    essential social choice function
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    group strategy-proofness
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    strategy-proofness
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