The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model (Q617603): Difference between revisions

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-Jorge A. Oviedo
@@ Property / author: Jorge A. Oviedo / rank @@
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+Jorge A. Oviedo
@@ Property / author: Jorge A. Oviedo / rank @@
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+MaRDI publication profile
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+W2101083265
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2101083265 / rank @@
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@@ Property / Wikidata QID @@
+Q124815375
@@ Property / Wikidata QID: Q124815375 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
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+Voting by Committees
@@ Property / cites work: Voting by Committees / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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+A further note on the stable matching problem
@@ Property / cites work: A further note on the stable matching problem / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
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+Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
@@ Property / cites work: Some remarks on the stable matching problem / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
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+On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model<sup>∗</sup>
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
+Normal rank