The robustness of robust implementation (Q643278): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.011
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+W3125610068
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+Robust Mechanism Design
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+Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
@@ Property / cites work: Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms / rank @@
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+Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
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+Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
@@ Property / cites work: Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms / rank @@
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+The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
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+Efficient Auctions
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Robust trading mechanisms
@@ Property / cites work: Robust trading mechanisms / rank @@
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+The Limits of ex post Implementation
@@ Property / cites work: The Limits of ex post Implementation / rank @@
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+Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
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+Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
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+Continuous Implementation
@@ Property / cites work: Continuous Implementation / rank @@
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+An Efficient Auction
@@ Property / cites work: An Efficient Auction / rank @@
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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