Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives (Q656075): Difference between revisions
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11147-011-9067-4 / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 21:34, 4 July 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives |
scientific article |
Statements
Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives (English)
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26 January 2012
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hedge fund
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principal-agent problem
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high water mark
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fee contract
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