Why not proportional? (Q423056): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+F10
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B12
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6036103
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6036103 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.012
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2180825801
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2180825801 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Who has the power in the EU?
@@ Property / cites work: Who has the power in the EU? / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Welfarist evaluations of decision rules under interstate utility dependencies
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4488500
@@ Property / cites work: Q4488500 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3634878
@@ Property / cites work: Q3634878 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+L. S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Evaluating competing criteria for allocating parliamentary seats
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Square Root Voting System, Optimal Threshold and $$ \uppi $$ π
+Normal rank
@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:423056