The division problem with voluntary participation (Q427509): Difference between revisions

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+An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
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+Strategy-proof allotment rules
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+Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
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+A simple characterization of the uniform rule
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+An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
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+A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
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+Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points
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+A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule
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+An alternative characterization of the equal-distance rule for allocation problems with single-peaked preferences
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+A crash course in implementation theory
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+Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
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+The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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+Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
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+Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
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