Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule (Q430893): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9283-2
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+W1968714173
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+Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules
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+A simple characterization of the uniform rule
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+An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
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+A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
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+A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule
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+Indifference and the uniform rule
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
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+A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
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+Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
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+Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
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+The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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+Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
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