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Latest revision as of 21:00, 5 July 2024

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A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
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    A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network (English)
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    6 November 2012
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    repeated games
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    imperfect monitoring
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    networks
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    folk theorem
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    communication protocols
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