On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420): Difference between revisions

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+W2167624657
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
@@ Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank @@
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+A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
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+Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
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+Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Constrained school choice
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+On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
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+School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>
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+Procedurally fair and stable matching
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+Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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+When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
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+Robust stability in matching markets
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+Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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+Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
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+On randomized matching mechanisms
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+Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
@@ Property / cites work: Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets / rank @@
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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+Q3999327
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+Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
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+On cores and indivisibility
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+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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+Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
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