A characterization of the plurality rule (Q694893): Difference between revisions

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+Voting by Committees
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+Normal rank
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+A simple characterization of plurality rule
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+Normal rank
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+Social Choice and Individual Ranking I
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+Normal rank
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+Social Choice and Individual Rankings II
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+Normal rank
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+A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
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+Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
+Normal rank
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+A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
+Normal rank
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+Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
+Normal rank
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+A characterization result for the plurality rule
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+Normal rank
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+Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
+Normal rank
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+An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
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+Social Choice Scoring Functions
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+Normal rank