An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability (Q1925960): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Ahmet U. Alkan / rank
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Property / author: Ahmet U. Alkan / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.048 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2103878933 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 00:06, 6 July 2024

scientific article
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An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability
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    An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability (English)
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    27 December 2012
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    school formation
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    stable matching
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    peer effects
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    multilateral bargaining
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    assortative matching
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