A quantitative Arrow theorem (Q1930856): Difference between revisions

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+.2574
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+Positivity improving operators and hypercontractivity
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+Geometric bounds on the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck velocity process
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+Conditional hardness for approximate coloring
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Property testing and its connection to learning and approximation
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+The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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+A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem.
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+On the probability of a rational outcome for generalized social welfare functions on three alternatives
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+A tight quantitative version of Arrow's impossibility theorem
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+Gaussian bounds for noise correlation of functions
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+Noise stability of functions with low influences: invariance and optimality
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+Non-interactive correlation distillation, inhomogeneous Markov chains, and the reverse Bonami-Beckner inequality
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+Limit theorems for polylinear forms
@@ Property / cites work: Limit theorems for polylinear forms / rank @@
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+Robust Characterizations of Polynomials with Applications to Program Testing
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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