Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results (Q1938825): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 05:01, 6 July 2024

scientific article
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Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
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    Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results (English)
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    25 February 2013
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    social choice functions
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    binary ranges
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    groupstrategy-proofness
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    \(xy\)-monotonicity
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    \(xy\)-based rules
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