Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency (Q1942866): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 07:19, 6 July 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency |
scientific article |
Statements
Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency (English)
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14 March 2013
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transparency
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optimal delegation
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union wage determination
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