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Property / author: Hemaspaandra, Lane A. / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 09:06, 7 July 2024

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The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
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    The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections (English)
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    13 February 2014
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    computational complexity
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    computational social choice
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    elections
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    manipulation
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    online algorithms
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    preferences
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    sequential voting
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