Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures (Q2450091): Difference between revisions

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Property / author
 
Property / author: Fleurbaey, Marc / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0641-3 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2144534687 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q2783476 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Relative Utilitarianism / rank
 
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Property / cites work: The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: a defense / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Fair social orderings / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Q3867501 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 12:19, 8 July 2024