The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core (Q2511260): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.030 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 19:57, 8 July 2024

scientific article
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The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core
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    The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core (English)
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    5 August 2014
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    voting
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    group decisions
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    committee games
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    core
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    one-core
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