Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach (Q403981): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 23:59, 8 July 2024

scientific article
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Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach
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    Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach (English)
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    29 August 2014
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    multi-dimensional mechanism
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    indirect mechanism
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    budget constraint
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    revelation principle
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    taxation principle
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