The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations (Q485793): Difference between revisions
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| Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.015 / rank | |||
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| Property / OpenAlex ID: W2035817426 / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 12:59, 9 July 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations |
scientific article |
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The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations (English)
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14 January 2015
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principal-agent model
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subjective evaluations
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