Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable (Q2512655): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 15:26, 9 July 2024

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Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
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    Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable (English)
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    30 January 2015
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    mechanism design
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    foundation of incentive-compatibility
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    combinatorial auctions
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    mechanisms with verification
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