Bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods (Q2345450): Difference between revisions

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+W2069595390
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+.2832
@@ Property / arXiv ID: 1404.2832 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Auction Design
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal Auction Design / rank @@
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+Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
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+The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design
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+Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
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+Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
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+Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions
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+On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
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+An <i>n</i>-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications
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+Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
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+The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
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+Q4365235
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