Two simple variations of top trading cycles (Q496872): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B68
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6484418
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6484418 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+top trading cycles
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: top trading cycles / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+school choice
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+assignment
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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0820-4
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+W1990827958
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+Q57436378
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+Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
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+A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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+A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>
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+On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
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+The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
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+Procedurally fair and stable matching
@@ Property / cites work: Procedurally fair and stable matching / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Making just school assignments
@@ Property / cites work: Making just school assignments / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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+Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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+Q4273943
@@ Property / cites work: Q4273943 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+On cores and indivisibility
@@ Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank @@
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+Publication:496872