Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains (Q281414): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B14
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6578976
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6578976 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+single-peaked domain
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: single-peaked domain / rank @@
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+elementary monotonicity
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: elementary monotonicity / rank @@
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+MaRDI publication profile
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.011
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2313667674
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2313667674 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient compromising
@@ Property / cites work: Efficient compromising / rank @@
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+Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?
@@ Property / cites work: When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient? / rank @@
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+On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Tops-only domains
@@ Property / cites work: Tops-only domains / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Single-peaked orders on a tree
@@ Property / cites work: Single-peaked orders on a tree / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Matching markets under (in)complete information
@@ Property / cites work: Matching markets under (in)complete information / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Local incentive compatibility with transfers
@@ Property / cites work: Local incentive compatibility with transfers / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3332693
@@ Property / cites work: Q3332693 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:281414