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Revision as of 15:57, 13 July 2024

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Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
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    Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems (English)
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    12 April 2017
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    probabilistic rules
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    stability
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    Nash equilibrium
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    substitutability
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    cardinal monotonicity
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