Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems (Q521881): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B68
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B08
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08 / rank @@
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@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+A10
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10 / rank @@
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@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+E15
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 60E15 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6705231
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6705231 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+probabilistic rules
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: probabilistic rules / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+stability
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: stability / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+Nash equilibrium
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+substitutability
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: substitutability / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+cardinal monotonicity
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: cardinal monotonicity / rank @@
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@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2272261776
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2272261776 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
@@ Property / cites work: Some remarks on the stable matching problem / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
@@ Property / cites work: A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Random matching in the college admissions problem
@@ Property / cites work: Random matching in the college admissions problem / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
@@ Property / cites work: Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:521881