The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings (Q523460): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.015
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+W2551090796
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+Q124838431
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
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+Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
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+Voting by Committees
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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+Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
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+Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
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+Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
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+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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+Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
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+The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
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+When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
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+Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
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+On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model<sup>∗</sup>
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+On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
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+An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
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+The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
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+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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+Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
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