On stable rules for selecting committees (Q2358564): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 00:18, 14 July 2024

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On stable rules for selecting committees
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    On stable rules for selecting committees (English)
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    15 June 2017
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    committee
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    Condorcet
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    stable rule
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    reinforcement axiom
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    Pareto criterion
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