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Latest revision as of 23:42, 13 July 2024

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A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games
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    A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games (English)
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    20 June 2017
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    dynamic games
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    bargaining
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    folk theorem
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    subgame perfect equilibrium
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    one-period recall
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