Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge (Q2363423): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0993-0 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 03:21, 14 July 2024

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Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
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    Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge (English)
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    19 July 2017
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    adverse selection
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    first-best
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    full implementation
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    mechanism design
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    single-crossing property
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