Default and liquidation timing under asymmetric information (Q1695046): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2562949516 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The impact of voluntary disclosure on a firm's investment policy / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Venture capital, staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Asset sale, debt restructuring, and liquidation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Investment timing, asymmetric information, and audit structure: a real options framework / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Dynamic investment and capital structure under manager-shareholder conflict / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information: costs and benefits of privatized firms / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Investment timing, debt structure, and financing constraints / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 01:47, 15 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Default and liquidation timing under asymmetric information
scientific article

    Statements

    Identifiers