Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids (Q1742153): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0591-9
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2755714806
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2755714806 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Pricing in position auctions and online advertising
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bidding to the Top: VCG and Equilibria of Position-Based Auctions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Position Auctions with Consumer Search
@@ Property / cites work: Position Auctions with Consumer Search / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Hybrid auctions.
@@ Property / cites work: Hybrid auctions. / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentives in Teams
@@ Property / cites work: Incentives in Teams / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Hybrid auctions revisited
@@ Property / cites work: Hybrid auctions revisited / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
+Normal rank