Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match (Q1651286): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.011 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 03:31, 16 July 2024

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Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
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    Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match (English)
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    12 July 2018
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    matching
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    deferred acceptance algorithm
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    suboptimal behavior
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