The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games (Q1651290): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 02:31, 16 July 2024

scientific article
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The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
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    The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games (English)
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    12 July 2018
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    cooperative games
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    ternary voting games
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    ordinal equivalence
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    Shapley-Shubik index
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    postulates of power measures
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