Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas (Q1757561): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 21:42, 17 July 2024

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Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
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    Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas (English)
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    15 January 2019
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    type-specific minimum quotas
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    stability
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    priority rankings
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    deferred acceptance
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    controlled school choice
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