A marriage matching mechanism menagerie (Q1727951): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Importer (talk | contribs)
Created a new Item
 
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(3 intermediate revisions by 3 users not shown)
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2016.12.001 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2560399714 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Random assignment: redefining the serial rule / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A new solution to the random assignment problem. / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An $n^{5/2} $ Algorithm for Maximum Matchings in Bipartite Graphs / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup> / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Median stable matching for college admissions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5519710 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On the existence of fair matching algorithms / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: ``Sex-equal'' stable matchings / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Equitable selection in bilateral matching markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea / rank
 
Normal rank
links / mardi / namelinks / mardi / name
 

Latest revision as of 09:16, 18 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
scientific article

    Statements

    A marriage matching mechanism menagerie (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    21 February 2019
    0 references
    matching
    0 references
    assignment
    0 references
    social welfare
    0 references

    Identifiers