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Revision as of 23:30, 18 July 2024

scientific article
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Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
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    Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations (English)
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    29 March 2019
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    large elections
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    strategic voting
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    truth-revelation
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    stochastic voting rule
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    Bayesian Nash implementation
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