Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection (Q2302840): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 22:33, 21 July 2024

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Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection
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    Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection (English)
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    26 February 2020
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    bank monitoring
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    securitisation
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    moral hazard
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    adverse selection
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    principal-agent problem
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