Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction (Q1984694): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 06:57, 22 July 2024

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Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction
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    Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction (English)
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    7 April 2020
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    Bayesian mechanism design
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    single-item auctions
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    suboptimal mechanisms
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    second price auctions
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    sequential posted pricing
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    approximation ratios
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